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  What began as the subprime crisis in the United States during the summer of 2007 and 
morphed into a global financial crisis in the other advanced economies of the “North” has led to 
unprecedented fiscal stimulus efforts worldwide.  The “North,” including the United States, 
Ireland, the United Kingdom, Spain, Switzerland, and Japan, needed stimulus because banking 
crises are usually accompanied by severe and protracted recessions and rising unemployment. 
The “South” sought to stimulate domestic demand by fiscal means in the face of collapsing 
exports, as available financing from global capital markets dried up in a “sudden stop” as 
predicted by Guillermo Calvo. 
Emerging markets on the eve of the sub-prime shock 
 Fortunately for many emerging markets, this synchronous export and financing shock 
from the North came at a time where vast war chests of international reserves had been built over 
the “bonanza” years (Figure 1).  Reserve managers learned the lesson of the Asian Crisis that 
when times get tough, the advanced economies look inward and the first line of defense in their 
own resources.  In the fat years, commodity prices were booming, growth in the North was 
buoyant, international interest rates were low and stable, and international capital was plentiful. 
In such an environment, fiscal positions in many emerging markets improved markedly. Public 
debt levels had been stabilized, or even reduced, and many countries had substituted public 
external debt with domestic debt and lengthened the maturities of their outstanding debt.    
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If the adverse shock to the North had been a short-lived reduction in financing, as many 
observers believed at the time, emerging markets would have been well-placed to cope with the 
shock.  A combination of currency depreciation (now possible owing to more flexible exchange 
rate arrangements) and some international reserve losses would seem to fit the bill. In addition, a 
short-lived fiscal response that entailed increasing government expenditures for a limited period 
of time did not seem to carry substantive risks to debt sustainability. 
Figure 1.  Accumulation of International Reserves by Emerging Market and Developing 
Economies, 1980-2008 
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Source: Reinhart and Reinhart (2008). 
Such optimism proved to be misplaced in three important dimensions.  Firstly, as the 
Inter-American Bank Development Bank (2008) report entitled All That Glitters May Not Be 
Gold: Assessing Latin America’s Recent Macroeconomic Performance aptly emphasized, fiscal 
finances and external accounts were not as healthy as these appeared to be on the surface, once 
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accounting for the commodity price boom. Secondly, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) argued that 
relying on public domestic debt was no panacea.  Such domestic debts (often ignored in the 
literature and economic policy discussions) had historically often been defaulted on either 
outright or through unexpectedly high inflation. Furthermore, during the bonanza phase that 
ended in 2007, private debts (both domestic and external) had also been rising markedly in 
emerging markets. As crisis episode after crisis episode has consistently shown, private debts 
turn out to be contingent government liabilities. Thirdly, at the time of this writing, we are now 
two years after the onset of the crisis, with effects continuing to linger (even if recovery is at 
hand), which implies that this episode hardly classifies as fleeting shock as far as market 
participants, households, or policymakers are concerned. 
Response to the crisis: Fiscal stimulus, North and South 
 Led by the United States, fiscal stimulus packages in various guises and magnitudes 
found favor in both advanced and emerging economies.  By January 2009, the Global Economic 
Monitor, published by Institute for International Finance, detailed the packages either adopted or 
planned in about 20 advanced and emerging market economies, including China, Korea, Mexico, 
and Saudi Arabia.  Less than two months later, the list of countries had expanded to include 
Russia and Turkey, among others.1  The International Monetary Fund, both famous and 
infamous for advocating fiscal austerity packages in response to financial crises around the globe 
since its inception in 1945, began to advocate a “possible strategy whereby fiscal policy can 
foster the resumption of normal economic growth while maintaining public sector solvency.”2
 To be sure, avoiding the acute fiscal policy procyclicality that has plagued most emerging 
markets for decades is, indeed, progress. As Kaminsky Reinhart and Vegh (2003) document, 
 
                                                 
1 See Prasad and Sorkin (2009). 
2 See Cotarelli in the IMF’s March 2009 Finance and Development issue. 
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during 1965-2003 the most prevalent pattern in emerging markets during recessions (in contrast 
to their OECD counterparts) was sharp reductions in real discretionary fiscal spending. It is 
difficult to imagine that this would not help account for the greater volatility evident in emerging 
market output. 
Fashions and fundamentals 
Fashions are hard to resist, and it is now fashionable in much of the North to rely on a 
fiscal engine of growth.  As for emerging markets, however, boosting spending at a time in 
which revenues are contracting or, in many cases, collapsing for an uncertain period of time is an 
more complicated matter.3
1. Fiscal multipliers: North and South 
  Policymakers would do well to keep four risks in mind. 
Although there is little consensus in academic and policy circles as to point estimates, the 
discussion of fiscal multipliers in most OECD countries is at least informed by existing 
analytical and empirical studies.  For emerging markets as a whole, however, it is fair to state 
that a comparable literature does not exist. Obviously, one can anticipate from the few reliable 
case studies that are available that the cross-country variation is bound to be substantial.  Thus, 
any statement about fiscal multipliers for emerging markets (and developing countries) as a class 
has to be interpreted with care.   
In the regard, there has been especially timely recent work by Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh 
(2009), who calculate such multipliers for advanced high-income economies, emerging markets 
(middle income) and developing countries (low income) using quarterly data.  Their analysis 
suggests that: (i) the fiscal multiplier on impact is larger for developing and emerging market 
countries than for the advanced high-income countries; (ii) the opposite is true for the peak 
                                                 
3 This is not intended to underestimate the difficulty and (usually) controversy of undertaking any kind of change in 
fiscal policy in the advanced economies. 
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multiplier; (iii) and the cumulative multipliers are far smaller for emerging markets than for 
advanced economies, as the positive impact of fiscal spending on GDP dies out fairly quickly.  
2. Emerging markets and global crowding out 
Figure 2 highlights that public debt typically explodes in the years following a systemic 
financial crisis; on average, it nearly doubles three years after the crisis. Recessions lead to major 
revenue losses and fiscal spending expands, as the bailout of the banking sector proves costly 
and stimulus packages find favor.  With severe banking crises, deep recessions, or a combination 
of the two in the world’s largest economies simultaneously, international financing for emerging 
markets is likely to be far scarcer than during the bonanza years before 2007.  Financing budget 
deficits will not be easy or cheap. 
It is noteworthy that the last time the world experienced a crisis of the proportions of the 
present one (that is, the Great Depression), governments in the advanced economies were able to 
continue borrowing (Figure 3) as recovery remained elusive for nearly a decade.  Debt rises by 
44 percent in the first three years and by another 40 percent during years four through six.  By 
contrast, the public debt of emerging markets remained frozen after the third year. This was not 
the result of rebounding revenues balancing the budget--in a number of cases it was the result of 
sovereign defaults. 
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Figure 2.  Cumulative increase in real public debt in the three years following the banking crisis 
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Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis.  Only major 
(systemic) banking crisis episodes are included, subject to data limitations.  The historical average reported does not 
include ongoing crisis episodes, which are omitted altogether, as these crises begin in 2007 or later, and debt stock 
comparison here is with three years after the beginning of the banking crisis. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative increase in real public debt three and six years following the onset of the 
Great Depression in 1929: Selected countries 
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Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
Notes: The beginning year of the banking crises range from 1929 to 1931.  Australia and Canada did not have a 
systemic banking crisis but are included for comparison purposes, as both also suffered severe and protracted 
economic contractions. The year 1929 marks the peak in world output and, hence, is used as the marker for the 
beginning of the depression episode. 
3. Domestic debt is no panacea 
The tilt in favor of domestic debt financing in recent years is by and large a welcome 
development as it may help foster a domestic capital market. However, as Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008) argue, domestic debt is not new. Though less well documented than comparable external 
defaults, domestic defaults have been numerous through history.  Including domestic debt in the 
calculus helps explain why governments default on foreign debts at seemingly low levels of debt 
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(see debt intolerance below) and why they resort to inflation as a means of reducing their debt 
burdens. 
4. Above all--remember debt intolerance! 
Historically, emerging market defaults have taken place at levels of debt that would 
appear to be safe and even conservative by advanced economy standards. The defaults of Mexico 
in 1982 and Argentina in 2001 were not exceptions.  Table 1, shows that external debt exceeded 
100 percent of GNP in only 16 percent of the default or restructuring episodes, that more than 
one-half of all defaults occurred at levels below 60 percent—which would have satisfied the 
Maastricht criteria—and that defaults took place against debt levels that were below 40 percent 
of GNP in nearly 20 percent of the cases.  In effect, the external debt-to-GNP thresholds reported 
in Table 1 are biased upwards because the debt-to-GNP ratios corresponding to the year of the 
credit event are driven up by the real exchange rate depreciation that typically accompanies the 
event.  Real exchange rate depreciation typically accompanies a default of course, as locals and 
foreign investors flee the currency.  The fiscal “space” to implement ambitious stimulus plans in 
emerging markets is far more limited than that of advanced economies—not that policymakers in 
the latter may underestimating these constraints as well.  
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TABLE 1.  External debt at the time of default: Frequency distribution, 1970-2008 
External debt-to-GNP range at the first year of 
default or restructuring 
Percent of total defaults or restructurings in 
middle income countries 
 
Below 40 percent 19.4  
41 to 60 percent 32.3  
61 to 80 percent 16.1  
81 to 100 percent 16.1  
Above 100 percent 
 
16.1 
 
 
   Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) update of Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano(2003). 
 
Final reflections 
 Taken together, these four risks have broader implications than for fiscal policy alone--
these are risks to macroeconomic policy at large, especially in emerging market countries where 
central bank independence is of recent vintage.  Historically, fiscal dominance has played a 
major role in shaping the path of monetary policy, the exchange rate and inflation in many 
emerging markets. Gaining credibility is a long and difficult process, losing it to a fashion for 
fiscal stimulus can happen fairly quickly. 
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